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Enhanced Corporate Governance for Restaurant Companies:
The Role of Well Performing Audit Committees
During the past decade, a multitude of problems regarding accounting and
financial reporting issues in the United States have become exposed to broad
based scrutiny by regulators and the media. Many large publicly traded companies
such as Enron, World Com, Lehman Brothers and others have become bankrupt.
In addition, General Motors in the manufacturing area and K-mart in the retailing
sector have struggled as a result of poor management. Many financial services
companies were forced to merge or be rescued by federal government
intervention. Criminal sanctions were brought forth which caused the demise of
Arthur Andersen, LLP, which had been one of the world’s largest public
accounting firms. (Andersen was later cleared of criminal actions about two to
three years after it failed.) All of this caused the global business community to
become fully aware of the significance of high quality, ethical financial reporting.
During 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley act was passed by the United States
Congress and became law with President Bush’s signature. The goal was to usher
in an era of improved financial reporting for the United States. A continuing need
for effective, high quality financial reporting has been kept in the forefront by
issues regarding subprime lending and various types of sophisticated and exotic
financial instruments. In order to attain the goal of effective, high quality financial
reporting, all of the significant participants in the financial reporting process have
to fulfill many responsibilities. For publicly traded corporations, the list of
significant participants typically includes the outside auditing firm, the internal
auditors, senior management, and the corporation’s board of directors.
An indispensible element of an effective financial accounting and reporting
system is an effectively operating audit committee of the corporate board
interfacing in a suitable fashion with the internal audit function. One of the major
responsibilities of the audit committee is to maintain oversight of the activities of
management’s external and internal auditors.
The Development of Audit Committees
Audit committees have been required since 1978 by the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) when it mandated that all corporations traded on the NYSE
have an audit committee composed of members from their boards of directors. At
that point in time, the financial reporting community had recognized the
importance of audit committees to the financial reporting process.
The National Commission of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, usually
referred to as the Treadway Commission, emphasized the importance of audit
committees and strongly recommended the adoption of audit committee reports in
annual reports of corporations. The Treadway Commission’s recommendation
was for the chairman of the audit committee to issue a report that would be

included in the corporate annual financial report. A list of “good practice”
guidelines for corporate audit committees was set forth by the Treadway
Commission and are discussed in detail below.
Good Practice Guidelines – General Guidelines
The list of “good practice” guidelines was divided into three categories:
general guidelines, selection of the independent outside auditor, and post-audit
review. The size of the committee was among the items contained in the general
guidelines. The good practice general guidelines suggested that a corporate audit
committee should have at a minimum three members; yet, it should not be too
large as to inhibit each member from being an active participant in the
deliberations of the committee. The general guidelines also recommend that each
corporate audit committee member should be an outside, independent director of
the corporate board, and the terms of service on the audit committee should be
staggered. Regular meetings of the audit committee and reporting to the corporate
board of directors on a regular basis were also recommended by the Treadway
Commission’s good practice general guidelines.
All recommendations in this paragraph are also part of the general
guidelines of good practice. According to the National Commission of Fraudulent
Financial Reporting (1987), the corporate audit committee should oversee the
audits of both the internal and external auditor. It is the corporate audit
committee’s responsibility that there is coordination between both groups of
auditors. The internal and external auditors should specify to the corporate audit
committee how each of their audit scopes could lead to the detection of fraud or
identify internal control weaknesses. The head of the internal audit function or
other designated internal audit person and the independent public accountant
should meet privately with the audit committee. Should there be cases where the
independent accountant needs to rely on the work of other independent
accountants, the audit committee must require that their independent accountant
reviews the work of any other outside auditors. The audit committee must
consider the use of any additional outside auditors as an appropriate procedure.
The corporate audit committee must review, for compliance with company policy,
the expenses of corporate officers and their use of company assets. Both the
external and internal auditors need to be cognizant that the corporate audit
committee needs to be informed of any specific topical areas they discover that
requires the attention of the audit committee.
Good Practice Guidelines – Selection of an Independent Accountant
The process for the selection of the independent public accountant by the
corporate audit committee is the second category of guidelines contained in the
Treadway Commission good practice guidelines. The audit committee needs to

review the proposed audit fee and the engagement letter of the independent public
accountant. The audit committee also should oversee the level of audit partner
participation and the level of audit staff participation for the proposed audit
engagement. Should the audit committee select a new independent accountant, it
needs to review the process to enable a smooth transition from the predecessor to
the successor independent accountant. Because the selection of the independent
outside auditor must usually be ratified by the shareholders, the review process
helps to facilitate the needed shareholder notification and ratification vote.
Good Practice Guidelines – Post-Audit Review
The Treadway Commission also recommended another group of important
duties for the audit committees. These duties pertain to the many steps that must
be followed in a post audit review. The Treadway Commission specifies that the
audit committee be responsible for meetings with the corporation’s legal counsel.
Legal issues that could have a material impact on the corporation’s financial
statements should be discussed. These duties pertain to the many steps that must
be followed in a post audit review. Management’s explanations must be sought by
the audit committee for any significant variances in the financial statements
regarding all years of comparative financial statements presented. The audit
committee should review the consistency of the management’s discussion and
analysis (M D & A) section of the annual report with the information disclosed in
the annual report.
Another task for the audit committee is to question the outside auditors
and corporate management regarding any changes in the application of accounting
principles and auditing standards that would have an effect on the financial
statements. Corporate management needs to be questioned by the audit committee
regarding the existence of any items that may materially affect the financial
statements. The audit committee should give special attention to any accounting
accruals, significant reserves, estimates, and changes in estimates. The post-audit
review process needs to have the audit committee meet privately with the outside
auditors. This meeting should be a discussion of the quality of the internal audit
function and the quality of the corporate accounting and finance staff. The outside
auditors should discuss with the audit committee what the outside auditors’
greatest concerns are pertaining to the audit and if they would like to discuss any
other issues that have not already been discussed.
The management representation letter should be reviewed by the audit
committee. The outside auditor needs to be questioned by the audit committee
whether any issues surfaced in obtaining the letter or receiving satisfactory
coverage of issues set forth in the representation letter. The audit committee also
needs to deal with another set of issues that could have come to light during the
audit. These other issues concern contingencies, litigation, other claims,

judgments or assessments that were viewed by outside lawyers or in-house
company legal staff. The resolution of these legal issues or contingencies and/or
their disclosure in the corporation’s financial statements must be determined by
the audit committee.
The audit committee needs to review the M D & A section of the
corporate annual report with corporate management and the outside auditor. The
consistency of the other information contained in the corporation’s annual report
with the financial statements must be determined by the audit committee. Any
issues related to this must be discussed with the outside auditor. The audit
committee must determine whether the outside auditors need to meet with the
corporation’s full board of directors regarding answering any questions pertaining
to the audit of the outside auditors.
Good Practice Guidelines - Audit Committee Chairman’s Letter
The Treadway Commission recommended that the chairman of the audit
committee should have a letter in the corporate annual report that would
summarize the duties and activities of the audit committee. Because the Treadway
Commission’s recommendations did not have the force of a Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
reporting requirement, only a very small number of corporate annual reports have
ever included an audit committee chairman’s letter. However, the functioning of
the company’s audit committee has been described by a significant majority of
listed companies in the company’s report of management (Kintzele, 1991). These
companies believed it necessary to discuss their audit committee function in their
annual reports, but they did not want to create a separate report in the form of an
audit committee chairman’s letter. Those concerned about financial reporting on
the functioning of the audit committee found the discussion in the report of
management lacking much that was suggested to be written in the audit
committee chairman’s letter.
Independent, outside directors are required by the different stock
exchanges to serve as audit committee members. Not being an employee of the
corporation was the initial interpretation of an outside director. Soon a class of
“grey area” directors was identified.
Retired management, relatives of
management, consultants hired by the corporation, and individuals serving as
interlocking directors on two or more corporations were considered “grey area”
directors. The independent functioning of the audit committee could be at risk if
“grey area” directors served on the committee. A study (Klein, 2002) on the
independence issue of audit committees concluded that audit committee
independence increases with board size and board independence and decreases
with the firm’s growth opportunities and for firms that report consecutive losses.
In 1999 both the NYSE and the NASD (National Association of Securities

Dealers) declared requirements that permitted corporations the option of including
non-outside directors on their audit committees if they conclude that it is in the
best interest of the corporation to do so.
A Blue Ribbon Committee was established by the NYSE and the NASD in
1998. The committee attempted to address concerns of the SEC regarding audit
committee accounting and reporting practices. The Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (1999) issued its
report and ten major recommendations as follows:
1. Strict definitions of independence of directors serving on audit
committees of listed companies should be adopted by the NYSE and
NASD.
2. Larger companies should be required by the NYSE and NASD to
have audit committees composed entirely of independent directors.
3. Larger companies should be required by the NYSE and NASD to
have “financially literate” directors on their audit committees.

4. Each company should be required by the NSYE and NASD to adopt
a formal audit committee charter and review its adequacy annually.
5. Each company should be required by the SEC to disclose in its proxy
statement whether it has adopted an audit committee charter, as well
as other information.
6. Audit committee charters must state that the outside auditor is
ultimately accountable to the board of directors and the audit
committee for each company listed on the NYSE and NASD.
7. Companies listed on the NYSE and NASD should ensure that their
charters mandate that their audit committees communicate with the
outside auditor about independence issues, in accordance with
Independence Standards Board regulations.
8. Generally accepted auditing standards should require that the outside
auditor discuss with the audit committee the quality—not just the
acceptability—of accounting principles used.
9. The corporate annual report should include a letter from the audit
committee clarifying that it has reviewed the audited financial
statements with management and performed other tasks required by
the SEC.
10. The outside auditor should be required by the SEC to perform an
interim review under SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information,
before a company files its Form 10-Q.
11.
The Panel on Audit Effectiveness
The Panel on Audit Effectiveness, usually referred to as the O’Malley
Panel, was created in 1999 by the Public Oversight Board which was the
independent, private-sector body that oversaw the programs of the SEC Practice
Section of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The
SEC had concerns about the deliberate efforts by corporate management to
manipulate earnings. This panel was created as a response to those concerns. The
Panel on Audit Effectiveness (2000) issued a report with the following
recommendations which relate to audit committees:
1. Increase emphasis on internal control. Management should provide a
written report on the effectiveness of internal control.
2. Evaluate corporate reserves and review activity in them with the
auditors and management.
3. Have a minimum of two face-to-face meetings with the auditors. At
least one meeting should be in private. Topics to be discussed
include such issues as business risks, pressures on auditors, auditor

performance, and any plans to hire audit firm personnel into highlevel positions.
4. Request a report by management on the corporation’s control
environment and how that environment along with established
policies and procedures help to prevent or detect financial statement
fraud.
5. Ensure that there is cooperation between management and auditors,
so that auditors’ efforts relating to the detection of fraudulent
financial reporting are successful.
6. The audit committee should determine the threshold amount to preapprove non-audit services.

Actions by the SEC
Corporations were being persuaded by such bodies as the Treadway
Commission, the Blue Ribbon Committee and the O’Malley Panel to adopt their
recommendations.
These commissions and panels could only make
recommendations, but the SEC sets regulations that corporations must follow. On
December 15, 2000 the SEC issued a regulation requiring corporations in their
proxy statements to provide a report from their audit committee. The report was to
disclose whether the audit committee had recommended that the corporation’s
audited financial statements be filed with the SEC. Another disclosure was to
state whether the audit committee had a written charter which stated specific
duties of the committee. The SEC required that every three years the charter
would need to be submitted to the SEC.
New listing standards for the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange and
the NASDAQ were additionally approved by the SEC. These standards require
corporation’s disclosure whether their audit committee members are independent
of management and require that audit committee members have some financial
expertise.
The SEC was empowered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to establish the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). By April 2003 the
board was functional. The PCAOB sets standards for auditing publicly traded
companies and on a test basis reviews these audits performed by certified public
accountants for conformance with these standards. The establishment of many
regulations was left by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to the SEC.
Final rules were adopted by the SEC on March 3, 2003 that require a
public company to disclose whether its audit committee includes at least one
member who is considered a financial expert. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (2003) defines an audit committee financial expert as possessing the
following attributes:
• an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and
financial statements;
• the ability to assess the general application of such principles in
connection with accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves;
• experience in preparing, auditing, analyzing, or evaluating financial
statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of
accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and
complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by
the issuer’s financial statements, or experience actively supervising
one or more persons engaged in such activities;
• an understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial
reporting; and

• an understanding of audit committee functions.
Comparison of S&P 100 and Large Restaurant Companies
The previous section of this paper provides an extensive review of the role
of audit committees in corporate governance in the United States. It was intended
to erect the background necessary to determine the extent to which companies in
general, and restaurant companies in particular, are complying with audit
committee mandates and recommendations. This background provides a basis for
comparing certain aspects of the audit committees of S&P100 companies with
those of the top 51 restaurant companies.
A prior research project (Kintzele, Arndt, Kintzele & Kwiatowski, 2008)
reported on the audit committee disclosures of the S&P 100 companies for 2006.
Table 1 presents a summary of the membership of audit committees for both the
S&P 100 companies and the top 51 restaurant companies in Value Line, Inc., for
2008. Recall that the Treadway Commission recommended at least three
members for an audit committee. This table reveals that for the S&P 100
companies, just over half (51%) had three or four members on the audit
committee while most (86%) of the restaurant companies had three or four
members on the committee. All but one of the 51 restaurant companies met
Treadway’s recommendation for the minimum number of audit committee
members. Forty nine percent of the S&P 100 companies had over five audit
committee members, while only 12% of the restaurant companies had that many
members. Companies in the restaurant industry tend to have smaller audit
committees than is the case for S&P 100 companies.
Table 1

Membership on Audit Committees

Number of members
Two
Three or four
Five or six
Seven or eight
Nine or more

S&P 100 2006
%
0
51
44
5
0

Restaurant companies 2008/2009
%
2
86
12
0
0

Table 2 provides information on the number of audit committee meetings
held in a year. Whereas 75% of the S&P 100 firms held nine or more meetings

per year, only 19% of the restaurant companies met that many times per year.
Most (61%) of the restaurant companies met 6 or fewer times per year compared
to only 13% of the S&P 100 firms. All of the restaurant companies met the
recommendation of having at least three audit committee meetings per year.

Table 2

Number of Audit Committee Meetings in the Year

Number of Meetings

S&P 100 2006
Restaurant companies 2008/2009
%
%
One or two
0
0
Three or four
2
37
Five or six
11
24
Seven or eight
11
20
Nine or ten
33
12
More than ten
42
7
*Percentages do not equal 100% due to rounding.
Other important audit committee disclosures are presented in Table 3.
This table reveals that 85% of the S&P 100 companies reported that they had a
stated policy, for example, on how to deal with the situation when someone in the
company reports irregularities with the accounting function. This is often referred
to as a “whistleblower” policy. However, in the case of the restaurant companies,
98% reported having a stated whistleblower policy. For example, in the audit
charter of the McDonald’s Corporation (2008), under “Whistle blowing
Procedures” it states: “The Committee shall establish and maintain procedures
for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints received by the Company
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing matters and for the
confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the Company of concerns
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.”
When it came to the credentials of members of the audit committees, 86%
of the S&P 100 companies surveyed indicated at least one member should be
considered a “financial expert.” For the restaurant companies, 98% reported at
least one member should be a “financial expert.” Restaurant companies are doing
considerably better than the S&P100 companies in regard to this
recommendation. In the audit charter of Denny’s Corporation (2008), the policy is
stated as follows: “At least one member of the Committee shall be an “audit
committee financial expert” as defined by the SEC, and the company will make
the disclosure required by the rules and regulations of the SEC with respect to
such matters.”

A big difference between the S&P 100 companies and the restaurant
companies had to do with restrictions that committee members could not be on
other public companies’ audit committees. The charter of the Cheesecake Factory
(2009) states: “A member of the Committee may not serve on the audit
committee of more than two public companies in addition to the Company
without the prior determination by a majority of the independent directors of such
board that such concurrent service would not impair the member’s ability to serve
effectively as a member of the committee.” In the case of the S&P 100
companies, 60% of those surveyed had such a policy whereas only 33% of the
restaurant companies had one. Restaurant companies are considerably behind the
S&P 100 companies in this regard.
When discussing whether an audit committee member must be literate in
financial matters, only 85% of the S&P 100 companies believed it was important
enough to be stated in the charter whereas 100% of the restaurant companies
formally stated such a policy. In the charter of Bob Evans (2009), for example,
the following policy is stated: “All members of the Audit Committee must be
able to read and understand fundamental financial statements including the
Company’s balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement.” Clearly,
the restaurant companies are taking the financial literacy recommendation
seriously.

Table 3

Additional Audit Committee Disclosures in Proxy Statements

Whistleblowers
Financial Experts
Other Committee Memberships
Membership Financial Literacy

S&P 100 2006
85
86
60
85

Restaurant companies 2008/2009
98
98
33
100

Conclusions and Recommendations
Over the last several years, many industries have been tainted by scandals
and poor management. Specific examples include General Motors in the
manufacturing area, K-Mart in the retailing sector and Lehman Brothers in the
financial services industry. Audit committees can be effective vehicles to assist in
corporate governance. Restaurant companies appear to be adhering well to
recommendations on the composition and operation audit committees and value
their role in enhancing corporate governance. A reasonable conclusion is that
good corporate governance, due in part to the strengths of the audit committees, in
the restaurant industry has contributed to the lack of serious scandals in this sector
of the economy. A greater number of members on the audit committees of the
restaurant companies could provide more breadth and experience for those
committees. A limitation of this study that some of the higher percentages for the
restaurant companies compared to the S&P 100 companies could be explained by
the two year time lag between the two studies. Further research in this area could
be done to compare restaurant and lodging companies with regard to the audit
committee’s role in corporate governance. In the future, one would expect to see a
closer relationship between the internal auditors and the audit committee. This
would result in more value added to the financial reporting process.
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